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∗

[M]ost prisoners walk into prison because they know they will be dragged or beaten into prison if they
do not walk. They do not organize force against being dragged because they know that if they wage this
kind of battle they will lose—very possibly lose their lives. The experience of the prisoner is, from the
outset, an experience of being violently dominated, and it is colored from the beginning by the fear of
being violently treated.1
I have gradually acquired the belief that the alternative lies in the unfinished, in the sketch, in what is
not yet fully existing. The “finished alternative” is “finished” in the double sense of the word.2

INTRODUCTION
Confronting criminal law’s violence calls for an openness to unfinished
alternatives—a willingness to engage in partial, in process, incomplete reformist
efforts that seek to displace conventional criminal law administration as a primary
mechanism for social order maintenance. 3 The entrenched harms entailed by
invoking criminal law as a widespread social regulatory framework include at least
these: Approximately two million persons in the United States live on any given day
caged behind bars, the largest population in the world under criminal supervision.4

Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. For generative discussion,
insight, and inspiration, I owe thanks to Paul Butler, Sara Sun Beale, David Cole, Angela
Harris, Issa Kohler-Hausmann, David Luban, Derin McLeod, Naomi Mezey, Alyson Nelson,
Eloise Pasachoff, Nina Pillard, Alicia Plerhoples, Judith Resnik, Alvaro Santos, Louis Michael
Seidman, Joshua Teitelbaum, Philomila Tsoukala, Robin West, the editors of Unbound, and
especially Yxta Murray.
1 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1607 (1986).
2
THOMAS MATHIESEN, THE POLITICS OF ABOLITION: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ACTION
THEORY 13 (1974).
3 See also Cover, supra note 1, at 1601 (“Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the
imposition of violence upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a
result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.”).
4 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Mass Incarceration: Causes, Consequences, and Exit Strategies, 9 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 1 (2011); see also LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 1 (2011); Adam Gopnik, The
Caging of America: Why Do We Lock Up So Many People?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, at 72
(“The scale and brutality of our prisons are the moral scandal of American life.”). The United
States is an outlier relative to other countries in both its incarceration rates and public safety
outcomes, particularly with regard to gun violence and recidivism. See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY,
THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY
∗
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Conditions of confinement in U.S. prisons and jails are often brutal, as the following
images from the record accompanying the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion in
Brown v. Plata reflect:

Mentally ill inmates in holding cages in California prison system.5

California Institution for Men, August 7, 2006.6
DEMOCRACIES (2008); Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y.TIMES,
(Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/23prison.html; see also Kieran
Healy,
America
is
a
Violent
Country,
(Jul.
12,
2012),
http://www.kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2012/07/20/america-is-a-violent-country/
(demonstrating that the United States is more violent than other OECD countries (except
possibly Estonia and Mexico)); PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM (2011).
5 See Dave Gilson, Slideshow: California’s Jam-Packed Prisons, MOTHER JONES, (May 23,
2011),
http://www.motherjones.com/slideshows/2011/05/california-prisonovercrowding-photos/holding-cages (describing and displaying images from the record in
Brown v. Plata not incorporated in the Court’s opinion).
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Millions more are routinely subject to humiliating, racially and class-skewed
policing practices, to the looming threat of immediate incarceration, and to the stigma
of arrest, criminal conviction, probation, and parole.7 These intrusions visit longlasting physical, psychic and social-structural injuries upon those subject to them.8
What is more, these practices collectively ingrain an over-simplification of complex
social problems—mental illness, addiction, homelessness, and violence—reducing
these problems to binary conceptualizations involving criminal wrongdoers and
innocent aggrieved victims, and in turn foreclosing more careful, institutionally or
context-sensitive regulatory interventions. 9 All of this carries exorbitant costs:
spending on prisons outpaces investments in education, early childhood programs,
and public health; and family ties are routinely ruptured by criminal law’s

See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1950 app. A. (2011).
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999). There are various prevalent forms of subfelony penal control beyond conventional criminal case processing, including in the
misdemeanor and community supervision contexts. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial
Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Michelle Phelps, The
Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 35 LAW & POL’Y 51
(2013).
8 See, e.g., BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); see also
Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk: Sex, Torture, Control, in LAW AS PUNISHMENT/LAW AS REGULATION
155 (Austin Sarat et al. eds.) (2011) (“[S]tops and frisks cause injuries similar to those of illegal
forms of tortures …”); Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the NYPD's Stop-and-Frisk Policy in
the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813 (2007).
9
See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); see also
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2002) (exploring how crime and punishment policies are linked to
fundamental problems of governing contemporary societies); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE
ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2010)
(examining how faith in “free markets” has severely distorted U.S. punishment practices);
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons From the Deinstitutionalization of Mental
Hospitals in the 1960s (John M. Olin Law & Economis Working paper No. 542) available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/542-335-bh-incarceration_0.pdf.
(tracing
the
relationship between deinstitutionalization and the rise of mass incarceration and arguing that
the deinstitutionalization of mental hospitals in the 1960s offers important lessons to those who
seek to reduce the incarcerated population in the United States in the twenty-first century);
Bernard E. Harcourt, An Institutionalization Effect: The Impact of Mental Hospitalization and
Imprisonment on Homicide in the United States, 1934–2001, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 41 (2011)
(“[P]atterns of mental hospitalization versus incarceration are practically inverted over the
20th and 21st centuries.”).
6
7
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intervention in ways that contribute to inter-generational cycles of poverty,
underemployment, and disadvantage.10
Simultaneously, the over-reliance on criminal law to manage an array of social
concerns frequently fails to fulfill other socially valuable ends for which criminal law is
supposedly intended: honoring the interests of victims, and preventing assault, theft
and related misconduct. 11 In fact, criminal proceedings routinely re-traumatize
victims of serious crime through a prosecutorial process that fails to provide promised
closure or emotional repair to aggrieved persons.12 Moreover, both common sense
and substantial empirical evidence suggest that the vast size of the population under
criminal control, the excessive length of sentences, the absence of rehabilitative
opportunities for the convicted, and the degree of over-criminalization are such that
deterrence goals are not advanced and may even be undermined.13
Despite all of these indications that the status quo in U.S. criminal law
administration is profoundly dysfunctional—an institutional manifestation of the
deepest pathologies in our society—contemporary criminal law reform efforts and
scholarship focus almost exclusively on relatively limited modifications to the status

10 See, e.g., John Schmitt et al., CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY, THE HIGH
BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION (2010).
11 See, e.g., Gerald T. Hotaling & Eve S. Buzawa, Forgoing Criminal Justice Assistance: The NonReporting of New Incidents of Abuse in a Court Sample of Domestic Violence Victims, (January, 2003)
(unpublished
manuscript)
available
at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/195667.pdf. (finding victims of domestic
violence who initially turn to the criminal justice system for intervention may be so dissatisfied
with the outcome that they do not call the police the next time they need help); Yxta Maya
Murray, Rape Trauma, the State, and the Art of Tracey Emin, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1659 (2012)
(“Thousands of women submit rape kits to the police and wait, only to have them stowed or
thrown away.”); Editorial, Evidence of Rape Ignored, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2013 (citing as many as
400,000 untested stowed away rape kits in the United States).
12 See, e.g., Patrice Yancey Martin & R. Marlene Powell, Accounting for the “Second Assault”:
Legal Organizations’ Framing of Rape Victims, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 853, 856 (1994)
(“[W]omen whose cases were prosecuted were less well off psychologically six months after the
rape than were those whose cases were not prosecuted, attributing this result to the effects of
an adversarial legal system that subjects rape victims to challenge and duress.”).
13 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility & Discounting of
Imprisonment & the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1999) (considering diminishing
returns in terms of deterrence of increasing sentence lengths); Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its
Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2002) (“[E]ven if a deterrence distribution has a net immediate crimecontrol benefit over a justice distribution, over time that benefit may be outweighed by the
slowly building criminogenic effect that results when citizens come to hold their criminal
justice system in contempt.”); see also Yair Listokin, Efficient Time Bars: A New Rationale for the
Existence of Statues of Limitations in Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002) (demonstrating in
the context of statutes of limitations that delayed sentencing for a crime for more than five
years after its commission is likely inefficient from a deterrence perspective).
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quo. 14 These modifications may well render criminal law administration more
humane, but fail to substitute alternative institutions or approaches to realize social
order maintenance goals.15 In particular, these reformist efforts continue to rely on
conventional criminal regulatory approaches to a wide array of social concerns, with
all of their associated violence: on criminalization, policing, arrest, prosecution,
incarceration, probation, and parole. Thus, even as these reformist approaches may
offer substantial benefits, they remain wed to institutions that perpetrate criminal
law’s violence and to limited temporal and imaginative horizons.
By contrast, this essay explores a series of criminal law reform alternatives that
offer more fundamental substitutes for criminal law administration. More specifically,
this essay focuses on the possibilities of alternatives to criminal case processing that
substitute for the order-maintaining functions currently attempted through criminal
law enforcement. These alternatives hold the potential to draw into service separate
institutions and mechanisms from those typically associated with criminal law
administration. Further, these alternatives enlist on more equal footing and invite
feedback and input from persons subject to criminal law enforcement.
Importantly, this latter subset of reform alternatives is decidedly unfinished, partial,
in process. I will argue that this unfinished quality ought not to be denied as an
embarrassment or flaw, but instead should be embraced as a source of critical
strength and possibility. In this dimension, this essay is a preliminary call for more
attention on the part of legal scholars and criminal law reform advocates to unfinished
partial substitutes for the order-maintaining work performed by criminal law
administration—a call to attend further to as yet incomplete reformist alternatives
that may portend less violent and more self-determined ways of achieving some
measure of social order and collective peace. I begin to develop this argument by
drawing, in particular, on the work of the Norwegian social theorist and prison
abolitionist Thomas Mathiesen.
The essay proceeds in three parts. Part One introduces several influential
contemporary criminal law reformist approaches and argues that whatever their
considerable promise, they are limited as alternatives to social order maintenance
through conventional criminal law enforcement because of their fundamental
attachment to the status quo in U.S. criminal law administration, with all of its
associated violence. Part Two begins to examine the contours and theoretical
14 See DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP AND THE
END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA (2011) (proposing offering second chances
coupled with credible threats of harsh consequences to drug and gun offenders); Mark A.R.
Kleiman & Kelsey Hollander, Reducing Crime by Shrinking the Prison Headcount, 9 OHIO STATE J.
CRIM. L. 89, 92 (2011) (proposing issuing credible threats to subset of offenders to reduce
violations and incarcerations); FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW
YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL (2011) (examining likely beneficial
impacts in New York City associated with some combination of “hot spot” policing, stop and
frisk, and increased numbers of police and accountability mechanisms within police
departments).
15 See KENNEDY, supra note 14; Kleiman & Hollander, supra note 14; ZIMRING supra note
14.
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promise of “unfinished alternatives.” Part Three introduces five specific examples of
unfinished alternatives in the criminal law context. The “unfinished” quality of each
of these five alternatives—their partial, aspirational, in-process character—is crucial
to their potential to usher in new ways of thinking and speaking about criminal law,
and perhaps ultimately a reformed social order that involves less violence than the
status quo in criminally-oriented social order maintenance.

I. Landscapes of Contemporary U.S. Criminal Law Reform and Scholarship
This Part explores several influential contemporary criminal law reform accounts,
each of which takes both practically applied and scholarly forms. I argue in this Part
that despite holding substantial advantages over the status quo in U.S. criminal law
administration, each of these reformist projects is significantly limited in that each
relies fundamentally on maintaining a primary and central role for existing policing,
prosecution, or incarceration-focused mechanisms of social order maintenance. In
this respect, each falls short in enabling new institutional and conceptual means of
managing the problems currently predominately addressed through criminal law
enforcement. This ought to be of at least some concern to those interested in
confronting criminal law’s violence given the perhaps inevitable indignities and harms
associated with “stop and frisk” practices, hot spot policing, arrest, jail confinement,
and other forms of criminal supervision.16

A. “Flash Incarceration” and Project HOPE
With far-reaching impact, Mark A. R. Kleiman, professor of Public Policy at the
UCLA School of Public Affairs, has argued powerfully for a reform program of flash
incarceration-backed intensive probation. In When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less
Crime and Less Punishment, Kleiman proposes eliminating randomized severity in
criminal sentencing and concentrating on the swiftness and certainty of individuallytailored intensive probation supervision backed by the threat of immediate short-term
jail-based punishment.17 According to Kleiman and his collaborators, a program of
large-scale flash incarceration-backed intensive probation would reduce dramatically
both crime and incarceration. Kleiman maintains that this would decrease overall
rates of offending through more efficacious and targeted deterrence and would permit

See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2164-2166 (2002)
(“Stops, frisks, arrests, detentions, questioning—these things are generally unpleasant and can
be seriously harmful … Anytime the government does something that has concentrated costs
but diffused benefits, there is a danger that it will do too much … [P]olitical checks will not do
the job, given politicians’ natural tendency to worry too little about those who bear the
nonmonetary cost of police work …”); see also Butler, supra note 8 (noting the parallels between
“stop and frisk,” torture, and sexual harassment).
17 See MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME
AND LESS PUNISHMENT (2009).
16
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more persons to be released on intensively supervised probation, markedly shrinking
the size of incarcerated populations in prison (as opposed to jail).18
Kleiman’s proposals were first enthusiastically (and in important regards
successfully) embraced by Judge Steven Alm in his Project HOPE probation program
in Honolulu, Hawaii.19 Project HOPE deploys Kleiman’s 5 C formula for effective
deterrence, which stresses Concentration of the probation department’s attention on a
subset of the caseload that permits the supervising program to Communicate a Credible
warning of high-Certainty, high-Celerity sanction to each probationer. 20 Through
Project HOPE, Judge Alm supervises a group of high-risk drug-involved offenders; he
requires unusually intensive supervision and reporting; he warns that violation
(primarily failed or “dirty” drug testing) will result in an immediate hearing and
revocation, but he reduces the typical sanction to short two-day stays in jail as
opposed to many weeks, months, or years in prison. 21 Project HOPE probationers
are required to call a number every morning to learn if they will be randomly drug
tested. They are warned by Judge Alm before being assigned to Project HOPE that
violation of the terms of their probation, including failure to phone in, will lead to
immediate jail sanctions in contrast to the conventional supervisory regime in which
individuals are often permitted numerous lapses with less stringent supervision prior
to having their probation revoked and being sentenced to prison. Project HOPE
probationers are often randomly drug tested after phoning in, approximately six times
per month. If they test positive they are immediately sent to jail for a relatively short
stay.22
In a randomized controlled trial HOPE probationers had lowered violation rates
despite being more strictly supervised. Arrests for new felonies were also far less
frequent in the experimental group with days in prison reduced by over half. 23 Jail
time, however, was roughly equivalent for the two groups. Similar programs are now
being implemented in Alaska, California and Delaware, among other states, and the
Bureau of Justice Assistance will fund four replication programs, which contractors for
the National Institute of Justice will evaluate.24
Notwithstanding the notable cost-savings associated with reduced imprisonment
and reduced recidivism, the Project HOPE approach is still a criminal law reform
strategy that fundamentally relies on incarceration (and may result in equivalent use
of jail-based sentencing) even if it does in important respects (and this is hugely
significant) appear to reduce prison sentence lengths. Simply put, jail time is
equivalent for both groups in the HOPE study even if prison time is reduced.

See id.
See Kleiman & Hollander, supra note 14, at 102.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 103.
24 Id. at 103.
18
19
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Further, even short stays in jail may significantly disrupt a person’s employment,
family life, and have other significant deleterious consequences.
It may also be the case that the prison-reducing, cost-reducing results in the
Project HOPE study have something to do with the charismatic personality and
persuasive capacity of Judge Alm, who is extraordinarily thoughtful and committed to
his program.25 The results produced by Judge Alm may therefore not be replicable.
Moreover, it is too early to tell whether the warning regime and more effective
probation officer engagement in the Hawaii program or the monitoring structure and
flash incarceration are the more critical causal variables.
Finally, and most significantly, though, are the baselines according to which
“success” is determined and the limited normative vision for change in criminal law of
Project HOPE and Kleiman’s 5Cs deterrence model, as compared to an alternative
that would more fundamentally confront criminal law’s violence. Project HOPE’s
success is demonstrated by comparison to an utterly broken baseline—the status quo
in criminal law administration and underfunded and poorly orchestrated probation
and parole systems—characterized by extraordinarily high recidivism and prison
readmission, by gross racial and class disproportion, wasted lives and resources, and
minimal deterrent or other meaningful enforcement for the populations most often
targeted. 26 So although Kleiman’s proposed intensive monitoring and flash
incarceration regime may be a very significant improvement on that status quo, that
by itself does not make it a desirable (let alone optimal) reformist alternative to
conventional criminal law-oriented social order maintenance. It is not an alternative
means of social order maintenance but simply a limited, if still significant,
modification of the most dysfunctional aspects of the status quo regime. And it is a
modification that relies on the same instrumentalities—arrest, policing, jailing, and
probation or parole—that entail much of criminal law’s violence, even if to a lesser
degree and extent than the currently predominant approaches to supervised release.

B. “Don’t Shoot” and Operation Ceasefire
David Kennedy, professor of Criminal Justice at John Jay College of Criminal
Justice, writes about, studies, and organizes “Operation Ceasefire” programming.
Kennedy helped spearhead this deterrence-focused criminal law reform initiative
beginning in Boston in the late 1990s. 27 Like Kleiman’s work and Judge Alm’s
Project HOPE probation program, Kennedy’s “Ceasefire” interventions are also
“focused deterrence” efforts, which offer social support to offenders if they abstain
from violent behavior but threaten harsh enforcement in the instance of any

See Hon. Steven S. Alm, Triage: A New Medical Model for Sentencing and Probation,
PERSPECTIVES: AM. PROBATION & PAROLE ASS’N. 42 (Winter 2012).
26 See PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM 12 (2011) (finding that
between 8 to 50% of new prison admissions arise from violation of terms of probation or
parole, often for technical infractions not constituting new crimes).
27 See KENNEDY, supra note 14.
25
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violation.28 The “Ceasefire” interventions generally unfold as follows: Police identify
well-known offenders in a given community, establish cases against those individuals,
but in lieu of prosecuting invite those persons to a meeting where they are warned
that unless the shooting or drug dealing stops, they face immediate arrest, conviction,
and a lengthy prison term. The identified individuals are also provided with
information about social service programming.29 According to Kennedy, homicides
have fallen in multiple cities as a result of “Ceasefire” programming. However, none
of these results are necessarily attributable to Kennedy’s interventions as it is hard to
disaggregate the effects of “Ceasefire” programming from other factors that may have
contributed to declining crime in those jurisdictions.30
Kennedy’s project, like Kleiman’s, ultimately relies on the threat of lengthy prison
sentences, police presence, and looming prosecutions as a means of achieving focused
deterrence. Kennedy’s account too, then, fails to present a fundamental alternative to
social order maintenance organized around policing, prosecution, and prison-based
sentencing. Though it provides an important improvement over the status quo where
it reduces violence and incarceration, “Ceasefire” programming similarly modifies
minimally the operation of existing crime-governance arrangements without
departing from them.31 Again, the central institutions that are enlisted as drivers of
reform are threatened prosecution and incarceration, with all of the violence those
institutions entail. And though the deterrence message may be delivered in part by
community members and not just by police and prosecutors, the approach to order
maintenance is not substantially more self-determined than conventional criminal law
administration. This is not to say, of course, that “Ceasefire” programming may not
promise substantial benefits, but that it offers a limited temporal and institutional
account of alternative means of responding to the complex social concerns currently
regulated all too often through criminal law enforcement.

C. “Hot Spot” Policing, Stop and Frisk, and the City That Became Safe
In The City That Became Safe: New York’s Lessons For Urban Crime and Its Control,
Franklin Zimring, a law professor and criminologist at UC Berkeley, sets out to
understand how New York City managed to reduce by 80 percent rates of homicide,
robbery, and burglary at the same time as the incarceration rate in New York State
decreased by 28 percent between 1990 and 2008.32 The decrease in both crime and
incarceration in New York is particularly striking given that over the same period the
national incarceration rate increased by 65 percent and crime fell by only 40
percent. 33 Zimring considers a series of possible explanations and concludes,
See id.
See id.
30 See id.
31 See SIMON, supra note 9 (exploring crime-governance and its impact on U.S. carceral
practices).
32 See ZIMRING, supra note 14.
33 See id.
28
29
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effectively by process of elimination, that this additional crime decline is attributable
to some combination of “hot spot” policing (where police focus on crime “hot spots”),
stop and frisk, increased numbers of police, and increased policing accountability
mechanisms such as Compstat.34 Although it is explanatory rather than prescriptive,
Zimring’s account, like Kleiman’s and Kennedy’s, has received a great deal of
attention from criminal justice policy-makers and has been embraced by some as a
way to envision a criminal law reform program organized around “smart policing”
that would simultaneously reduce crime and incarceration.35
Even as there are clear benefits associated with the reductions in violent crime and
rates of incarceration suggested by Zimring’s analysis, the methods of hot spot
policing, diversion of public resources for increased policing capacity, and stop and
frisk themselves produce social harms. 36 For instance, “smart policing,” though
undoubtedly an improvement in terms of cost-savings and improved welfare over
larger-scale incarceration, continues to locate social order maintenance in
conventional criminal law enforcement institutions and in policing tactics that entail
not insubstantial indiginities and painful intrusions.37 These approaches similarly fail
to transform the ethos of the relevant institutions so that they might perpetuate less
violence. Accordingly, Zimring’s account and the New York City policing reforms
fail to depart from the central institutions, approaches, and power relationships that
contribute to perpetuating criminal law’s core harms. Whatever other promise those
reforms hold, they are thus limited as violence-reducing alternative approaches to
social order maintenance through criminal law administration.

D. Cross-Cutting Imaginative and Institutional Limitations: Revisiting the
“Trolley Problem”
The famous “trolley problem” may help to capture more broadly and
metaphorically some of the crucial limitations that cut across these and various other
contemporary criminal law reform accounts. 38 The trolley problem is a moral
paradox or hypothetical first posed by the philosopher Philippa Foot in her 1967
paper, “Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect.”39 The most common iteration
of the problem relates to a trolley on a track. The trolley is careening toward a group
See id.
See, e.g., Gopnik, supra note 4; Heather MacDonald, It’s the Cops, Stupid!, NEW REPUBLIC
(Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/franklin-zimring-new-york-urbancrime-control-city-safe#.
36 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 8; Gelman, supra note 8.
37 See Butler, supra note 8; Gelman, supra note 8.
38 See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1395-1415 (1985).
39 Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect in VIRTUES AND
VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978) (originally
appeared in the Oxford Review, No. 5, 1967).
34
35
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of persons who face certain death if they are hit. One is asked to imagine oneself as
the conductor and to choose whether to divert the trolley from the course where it
will kill many more people (by flipping a switch) to a course where it will kill only one.
The choice is effectively between sitting passively by as a larger group of persons is
killed or flipping the switch to prevent those persons’ deaths but actively contributing
to the death of one innocent person.
The original formulation of the problem by Foot is closer to the subject of criminal
law’s violence:
Suppose that a judge or magistrate is faced with rioters demanding that a culprit be
found for a certain crime and threatening otherwise to take their own bloody revenge
on a particular section of the community. The real culprit being unknown, the judge
sees himself as able to prevent the bloodshed only by framing some innocent person
and having him executed.40

This is a difficult and painful choice that confronts the judge (or the trolley conductor)
and the problem is used, among other purposes, to test our moral intuitions about
consequentialism.
The argument in the foregoing and following sections, however, is that we ought
to resist the hypothetical in some measure. The trolley problem may be resisted
because it presents a choice created out of a false sense of necessity. And in our criminal
law and policy we are often acting out of a similar sense of false necessity.
The judge in Foot’s formulation of the problem may turn to other institutions,
may act to bring about changes in the governing regime, in legal institutional design,
in political design, in ways that refuse the rioters their claim to harm others and refuse
to frame an innocent person. Likewise, in confronting criminal law’s violence, an
important response may be to recognize that we have too readily accepted at the
outset a bad set of political and institutional design choices. These choices could be
rejected, with the insistence instead that it ought to be possible to manage drastically
fewer problems relating to mental illness and addiction, among other complex social
concerns, through criminal law administration. In other words, other social
institutional and political design choices might obviate the trolley problem that faces
us in some significant measure.

II. The Alternative as Unfinished
This Part will begin to explore how it might be both important and necessary
to undertake criminal law reform initiatives that are less comprehensive, less complete
in their proposed modifications to the status quo in criminal law administration and
less reliant on the institutions of policing, prosecution and prison or jail-based
punishment. The unfinished alternatives explored in this and the following Part seek
to confront criminal law’s violence by substituting alternative mechanisms of social order
maintenance and by enlisting in the project of reform other social entities and persons
subject to enforcement regimes themselves. Accordingly, these alternatives may
40

Id. at 23.
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enable other social institutional and political design choices, other less violent means
of achieving some semblance of social order or collective peace.
What more precisely is an “unfinished alternative” or the “alternative as
unfinished”? An unfinished alternative is a “sketch,” a beginning, an attempt to
change the existing state of affairs through an intervention that is partial, incomplete
and in process. In his book The Politics of Abolition, Norwegian social theorist and
prison abolitionist Thomas Mathiesen explains some of the promise of unfinished
alternatives as follows:
“[A]ny attempt to change the existing order into something completely finished, a
fully formed entity, is destined to fail . . . .”41 An “alternative is ‘alternative’ in so far
as it is not based on the premises of the old system, but on its own premises.”42
Any viable alternative approach must contradict at least certain premises of the old
system and at the same time compete with the system to be replaced.43 In other words,
for an alternative to be truly distinct from the existing state of affairs, it must in some
significant manner be dissimilar from things as they are (it must contradict); though,
to be plausible as an alternative, any proposal for change must not be so contradictory
as to be unrecognizable and unfathomable in light of the world as it is (it must
compete).44
When a truly contradictory alternative is fully formed, that is “finished,” in the
context of the existing system it will likely be rejected out of hand because it is so
foreign to the existing system as to be unrecognizable as a viable state of affairs. It is
thus contradictory but non-competing: such fully formed contradictions will “be
disregarded as permanently ‘outside’ and thereby be set aside.”45
Mathiesen clarifies that “the concept of competition takes, as its point of
departure, the subjective standpoint of the satisfied system-member being confronted
with an opposition. The political task is that of exposing to such a member the
insufficiency of being satisfied with the system as it is. When this is exposed, the
opposition competes.”46
Therefore, any meaningful workable alternative must be articulable in terms that
are recognizable and conceivable to someone embedded in the existing state of affairs.
However, such an alternative must retain in significant measure its inconsistent
features, so as to remain distinct from the status quo. Another problem confronted by
See MATHIESEN, supra note 2, at 13.
See id.
43 See id. at 14.
44
See id.
(“An arrangement which does not compete with the old system, an arrangement which
is not relevant for the members of the old system . . . is no alternative. The main
problem, then, is that of obtaining the combination of the contradicting and the
competing; the main problem is that of avoiding that your contradiction becomes noncompeting and that your competition becomes agreement. The main aim is that of
attaining the competing contradiction.”)
41
42

45
46

Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 14.
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“finished” (i.e. complete, fully formed) alternatives is that in order to remain
conceivable they cease to be truly alternative, that is, distinct from and oppositional to
the status quo.
The unfinished alternative is what permits the competing contradiction, because
an alternative that seeks to express a different and distinct arrangement but in a
partial manner that does not entirely displace or re-make the status quo (i.e. is
unfinished) can remain both unlike existing arrangements and legible within them. Put
otherwise, the unfinished alternative presents the possibility of sustained competition
and contradiction within the existing system because although it is truly alternative in
the sense of promising something different, it is decidedly not fully formed, and so can
be envisioned as coming into being incrementally within the bounds of the existing
system, even as, at some later point, the alternative itself may usher in a new state of
affairs that will displace the existing state of affairs.
This partial or suggested quality is necessary too because it is not possible to
generate an alternative that is truly and utterly distinct from the status quo as our
imaginations are constrained by our existing social arrangements. The unfinished
alternative emerges when we refuse “to remain silent concerning that which we
cannot talk about.”47
Of course, it is an immense challenge to maintain a sketch as a sketch in political
life. As Mathiesen recognizes: “An enormous political pressure exists in the direction
of completing the sketch into a finished drawing, and thereby ending the growth of
the product.”48 But in our grasping attempts to fashion a competing, contradictory,
and in that sense new state of affairs, we “express the unfinished.”49
The following table captures some of the limits and possibilities associated with
unfinished alternatives reform proposals that aim both to compete with and
contradict the status quo.50
The proposal is
Suggested
Fully Formed

Foreign
Competing
contradiction
(alternative)
Non-competing
contradiction

Integrated
Competing agreement
Non-competing
agreement

Mathiesen offers several examples of “unfinished” alternatives. These include love
and the “treatment experiment” in Scandinavian criminal justice policy that unfolded
in concert with the advocacy work of a prison reform organization KRUM (the
Norwegian Association for Penal Reform).
Love is unfinished for “love is boundless.”51 Love’s precise beginnings and endings
are uncertain: “We do not know where it will lead us, we do not know where it will
Id. at 16 (interpreting Wittgenstein).
Id. at 13.
49 Id. at 16.
50 Lightly adapted from id. at 17.
47
48
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stop. . . . It ceases, is finished, when it is tried out and when its boundaries are
clarified and determined—finally drawn. It represents an alternative to ‘the existing
state of things:’ to existence in resigned loneliness or routinized marriage.”52
In a somewhat more concrete manner, Mathiesen notes the Scandinavian
prisoners’ welfare movement organization KRUM and the associated “treatment
experiment” existed in “an unfinished state [during their development] . . . .”53 The
modern Scandinavian prison reform movement, Mathiesen explains, began with an
unprecedented gathering in the late 1960s of a “Parliament of Thieves” from
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden who convened in large numbers and told the public
and the press what life in prison was like.54 Continuing to the present, convicted
offenders may obtain furloughs from prison to participate in the organizations’
meetings and conferences.
Numerous reforms in treatment of prisoners and in criminal justice policy have
occurred over the period of time in which KRUM and associated organizations have
been active. The very unfolding of this experiment—the radical inclusion and
collaboration of prisoners, state administrators, and criminal justice policy experts to
uncertain ends—presented an alternative to the established state of things, for
example to traditional hierarchically-structured hospitals and prisons.55 Over time,
Norway’s prison movement, through KRUM and related organizations, brought
about a radical shift in criminal law and prison administration in the region. Minor
offending conduct was effectively decriminalized and more serious conduct is
punishable by a maximum of twenty-one years incarceration.56 On Norway’s Bastoy
Prison Island, which houses serious violent offenders, including persons who have
committed murder, the “governor” of the prison is a clinical psychologist, training to
become a prison guard is a three year course, and the goal of the imprisonment
experience is for serious offenders to take responsibility for their acts removed from a
context where they would pose a threat to others, and to obtain release with the
ability to function without violence.57 Prisoners grow their own food, they live in
humane conditions with access to education, work and skills training, and the
recidivism rate is 16%, the lowest in Europe and far below that of any U.S.
jurisdiction. 58 Conditions in Bastoy, depicted in the image below where an inmate
sunbathes on the deck of his bungalow, seek to mimic and improve upon in significant
respects conditions to which prisoners might otherwise return upon their release. 59
Id. at 16–17.
Id.
53 See Thomas Mathiesen, About Krom – Past – Present – Future (January 2000),
http://www.krom.no/hva_er_krom_more.php?id=89_0_26_0_C.
54 See id.
55 See MATHIESEN, supra note 2, at 17.
56 See Erwin James, The Norwegian Prison Where Inmates Are Treated Like People, GUARDIAN,
Feb. 24, 2013, G2 at 9.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 See id.
51
52

Vol. 8: 109, 2012-2013

MCLEOD: CONFRONTING

123

60

Mathiesen points out, though, that the treatment experiment in the Scandinavian
context ceased to be unfinished, when “wondering” withered and “boundaries were
drawn,” when the treatment project was incorporated into the establishment, and
became integrated with criminalization and punishment or medicalization. 61
Nonetheless, the marked confrontation and contradicting perspectives presented by
the reformist coalitions forged through KRUM contributed to substantial shifts in
what was conceivable as a response to social disorder.
Crucially, the organization’s efforts reached their greatest potential not in their
ultimate, fixed realization but as they came to impact and reshape perspectives on
how social order (and criminal law) might be administered. KRUM’s potential
inhered in an often grasping, incremental attempt to fashion a social imaginary
around a shared set of problems, with unclear temporal horizons, and flexible, inprocess organizational or institutional parameters.62
“What is strange,” Mathiesen notes, “is that we rarely act in line with this. We
rarely view the ‘pioneering stage’ as life itself; rather we tend to view it as ‘only a
beginning.’”63 What Mathiesen’s work offers to contemporary criminal law reformist
scholarship and advocacy is a framework within which to engage seriously and learn
from unfinished, in-process, and, in that regard, potentially truly alternative
initiatives. In contrast to many contemporary criminal law reformist projects, this
framework and associated initiatives may promise new and substantially less violent
conceptual and institutional approaches to social order maintenance.

Photograph: Marco Di Lauro.
MATHIESEN, supra note 2, at 17.
62 See id.
63 Id.
60
61
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III. Unfinished Criminal Law Reformist Alternatives
This Part begins to consider five criminal law reform innovations which represent
unfinished efforts to re-shape criminal law enforcement and social order maintenance
practices in a fundamental, thoroughgoing, structural and yet still partial direction.
Each of these reformist projects enlists institutions and persons apart from
conventional criminal law administrative entities—decriminalization boards,
agricultural and infrastructural developers, former narco-cultivators, violence
interrupters or community member mediators, and a range of social service providers
aligned with certain specialized diversionary courts. Some of these efforts also enlist
persons previously subject to criminal law enforcement in the formulation and
execution of relevant policies. This expansion in the range of institutions and
perspectives brought to bear on the problems of achieving social order promises to
improve the self-determining character of resulting policies, and perhaps in so doing
to improve perceived legitimacy and compliance, as well as to reduce violence.

A. Decriminalization
Decriminalization, particularly decriminalization of narcotics-related conduct,
may be an important component of confronting criminal law’s violence. In the
United States, large numbers of persons are arrested for marijuana-related violations,
including simple possession, when there is little if any evidence that marijuana causes
substantial harm.64 By some accounts, there were 50,000 arrests in New York City in
2011 for minor possession of marijuana.65
Responding to public sentiment that marijuana criminalization in particular is
misguided, numerous U.S. jurisdictions have partially decriminalized marijuana
possession, including Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington, among other states. 66 This gradual
decriminalization reform will reduce the human and economic costs of large-scale
arrest and incarceration of persons for marijuana-related offenses.
Some jurisdictions have gone substantially farther, decriminalizing a greater range
of controlled substances and shifting to a public health model for addressing the
problem of addiction. In 2001, Portugal, for example, became the first European
country to officially abolish all criminal penalties for personal possession of narcotics,
including marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine.67 Individuals found to
possess small amounts of these narcotics are sent to a panel composed of a
psychologist, social worker, and legal counselor for appropriate treatment. The
See, e.g., The Marijuana Arrest Problem, Continued, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 4, 2012.
See id.
66 See NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS (NORML),
STATES THAT HAVE DECRIMINALIZED, http://norml.org/aboutmarijuana/item/statesthat-have-decriminalized (last visited Apr. 24, 2013).
67 See GLENN GREENWALD, DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL: LESSONS FOR
CREATING FAIR AND SUCCESSFUL DRUG POLICIES (2009).
64
65
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treatment may be refused without criminal punishment and there is no looming
threat of jail.68 A 2009 study by the Cato Institute found that in the five years after
personal possession was decriminalized, illegal drug use among teens in Portugal
decreased, rates of new HIV infections through sharing of dirty needles declined, and
the number of people seeking treatment for drug addiction more than doubled.69
Following decriminalization, Portugal had lower rates of drug use than other
European countries and substantially lower drug use rates than the United States. 70
Decriminalization undoubtedly raises a host of questions unaddressed in this
necessarily preliminary exploration. How far decriminalization could extend and to
what categories of drug-related and other conduct is uncertain. It is even unclear
whether or how decriminalization would take hold in particular locales subject to
pervasive and damaging drug law enforcement. The prospects for decriminalization
and its desirability in any given jurisdiction likely depend significantly on local
political and other circumstances pertaining to drug markets, patterns of addiction,
and broader patterns of interpersonal conflict and harm. But decriminalization is a
criminal law reform alternative that may serve to substantially reduce criminal law’s
violence and to shift resources and attention to other institutions as sites for managing
addiction and other forms of social disorder. It is an unfinished alternative that ought
to occupy a more prominent place than it currently does in criminal law reformist
discourse, both in the narcotics context and in other currently criminalized contexts.

B. Alternative Development
Alternative Development Programming, championed by the United Nations in the
criminal law and development context, involves subsidies to narco-cultivators to
introduce non-narcotic crops—such as oil palm, which can be used as bio fuel or to
make other consumer products—and technical assistance with accessing international
markets until the licit alternative becomes self-sustaining. 71 Participation in
alternative development programming is often voluntary, not subject to threat of
criminal or other legal sanction. Studies of the effects of alternative development
programming show that on a local scale many narco-cultivators elect to switch
entirely to the licit alternative if it allows them to better provide for their families and
enables an improved quality of life.72 Areas that transition from narco-cultivation to
other crops may also experience a significant reduction in the violence associated with
narco-trafficking.73
One alternative development client, a coffee-growing cooperative in the Cuzco
Province of Peru, the Central Cooperativas de la Convención y Lares, increased its
See id.
See id.
70 See id.
71 See, e.g., U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Alternative Development: A Global Thematic
Evaluation: Final Synthesis Report, at v–vi, 12–13 (Mar. 1, 2005).
72 See id.
73 See id.
68
69
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exports from 3,000 tons in 1997 to 8,000 tons in 2003.74 Since 1997, the cooperative
has exported directly rather than through middlemen, and in 2001 ceased relying on
foreign development assistance.75
In Colombia’s southern Cauca Province, in 1993, where both coca bush and
poppy are grown, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime helped to support the
formation of the Empresa Cooperativa del Sur del Cauca to organize 19 small-farmer
producer groups.76 Along the same lines as the Peruvian coffee growing cooperative,
the Colombian organization makes it possible for 1,500 families, many Amerindian,
to sell fair trade organic coffee (at twice the farm-gate price of regular coffee) to
Europe.77 Though alternative development programming is not without its problems,
limitations, and critics, this particular project has increased the wealth of these
farmers through a transition to crops that are more lucrative and secure than their
previous livelihoods.78
In the coca producing region of the Huallaga Valley in Peru, a producers’
association and a processing plant, with initial financial assistance from the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime shifted to producing palm oil.79 Palm oil is
derived from the fruit of small tropical palm trees and can be used to produce edible
vegetable oil, soap, and as an ingredient in bio-fuels. 80 The association and
processing plant have assumed a hybrid institutional form, as both cooperative and
firm, in which both the association and individual farmers hold shares.
In these programs too the farmers are not forced to participate. Rather, the
farmers join the program on a voluntary basis and may transition gradually to the licit
crops.81
Some Latin American states are also now buying coca crops from narcocultivators to make toothpaste, soap and other consumer products. This is occurring
at the same time as certain of the United States-promoted criminally-focused
counternarcotics policies are being reconsidered.82
Tying social order maintenance to development programming or government
buy-outs of narco-crops as an alternative to conventional criminal law intervention is
a partial, unfinished alternative in that it is unclear how it would be scaled up and out,
Id. at 5.
Id.
76 Id at 6.
77 Id.
78 See id.
79 See id at 5.
80 See id.
81 See id at vii.
82 See Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 161
(2010); Jean Friedman-Rudovsky, Bolivian Buzz: Coca Farmers Switch to Coffee Beans, TIME, Feb.
29, 2012, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2107750,00.html; Evo Morales
Launches
‘Coca
Colla,’
TELEGRAPH,
Jan.
10,
2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/bolivia/6962746/Evo-Moraleslaunches-Coca-Colla.html.
74
75
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or how it would interact with campaigns for decriminalization of certain conduct. It
is possible to imagine how social order maintenance could be tied to development
programming without changes to substantive criminal law, but simply in the face of
different discretionary enforcement decision-making, or to imagine alternative
development programming as a complement to decriminalization programs.
Unlike some of the influential criminal law reformist approaches examined in Part
I, alternative development is not introduced as a model that may be uniformly
adopted in other locations or without adjustment outside the narco-cultivation
context. And of course, it is important to note that alternative development
programming carries its own costs and is not a panacea for the harms of the narcotics
trade or narcotics addiction.
For present purposes, it is most significant that alternative livelihoods programs
both enlist separate institutions in order maintenance (development organizations,
agricultural consultants, exporters, and related actors), in a partial and incremental
manner, and enable the formation of associations of former narco-cultivators to selfdetermine how best to structure their businesses and maintain security in their
respective regions.
Additionally, due to this unfinished, context-dependent,
incremental approach, alternative development programs may be defined gradually,
with experiential and rigorous empirical input over time, in ways that might enable
both conceptually and institutionally alternative, and less violent, forms of response to
social disorder and unauthorized economic activity.
In these respects, alternative development programming may serve as a model for
intervention in domestic narcotics markets in the United States or in other currently
criminalized markets. For example, alternative livelihoods could be subsidized for
persons involved in selling narcotics in U.S. neighborhoods until licit or preferred
alternatives become self-sustaining. More broadly, this model offers a manner of
imagining institutional and structural social order maintenance alternatives to
predominant reliance on criminal law administrative apparatuses to achieve desired
objectives. Small business development assistance operating similarly to the assistance
that facilitates alternative livelihoods for narco-cultivators in rural contexts may serve
as a means of envisioning less violent incremental intervention in various domains of
criminalized conduct, particularly where participation in the licit alternative is
voluntary rather than induced through the threat of incarceration.

C. Infrastructural Reform
A movement in criminal justice policy toward “problem-oriented” social order
maintenance commends infrastructural and design improvements as a means of crime
reduction. Improvements along these lines include investments such as improved
street lighting, store design, product design, and facility design. 83 These design

83 See, e.g., Ronald V. Clarke & Patricia M. Harris, Auto Theft and Its Prevention, 16 CRIME &
JUST. 1, 37 (1992) (reviewing how simple design interventions may substantially reduce auto
theft); Cecelia Klingele et al., Reimagining Criminal Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 966
(exploring how sprinkler systems may dispel outdoor, open-air drug markets); McLeod, supra
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reforms may go a considerable distance toward reducing risks of interpersonal
violence, including robbery and rape, if places where such offenses occur are better
lighted and more secure. The degree to which design—design of physical spaces,
cars, windows and the like—could inhibit theft and other interpersonal harm is
uncertain, but it is a mode of thinking about social order maintenance and crime
prevention that moves toward a focus on space and opportunities to offend rather
than on conventional policing, prosecution, and punishment. 84 Further, it is an
incremental, partial, in-process approach increasingly embraced by development
agencies and progressive law enforcement organizations. 85 The following table
reflects how both design modifications and other opportunity and incentive-shaping
policy choices may be conceptualized as operating to maintain social order outside
the framework of conventional criminal law enforcement, even as these interventions
may generate other under-appreciated costs.86

note 82 at 160 (discussing how infrastructure development—including public transportation
networks and street lighting projects—may serve as a means of improving citizens’ security).
84 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002).
85 See, e.g., VERA LUCÍA VECENTINI ET AL., INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, PERU:
METROPOLITAN LIMA URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM (PTUL)—NORTH-SOUTH
SUBSYSTEM: LOAN PROPOSAL 5, 13, 38 (2004) (proposing that improvements to public safety
will be associated with improving public transport and street lighting); see also Clarke, supra
note 83.
86 Adapted from CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING, TWENTY-FIVE TECHNIQUES
OF SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION (2012), http://www.popcenter.org/25techniques.
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Increase Effort

Increase Risk

Reduce Rewards

Target harden
-steering
column locks
-anti-robbery
screens

Extend
guardianship
-leave signs of
occupancy
-neighborhood
watch

Conceal targets
-unmarked
bullion trucks
-off-street
parking

Control access
-electronic card
access
-entry phones

Assist natural
surveillance
-improved
street lighting
-defensible
space design
Reduce
anonymity
-taxi
driver
IDs
-school
uniforms
Utilize place
managers
-CCTV
-at least two
clerks in stores

Remove targets
-increase
women’s
shelters/refuges
-removable car
stereo
Identify
property
-property
marking

Strengthen
formal
surveillance
-burglar
alarms

Deny benefits
-graffiti cleaning
-speed humps
-ink
merchandise
tags

Screen exits
-electronic
merchandise
tags
Deflect
Offenders
-street closures

Control
tools/weapons
-disable stolen
cell phones
-gun control

Disrupt markets
-monitor pawn
shops

Reduce
Provocation
Reduce
frustrations and
stress
-muted lights
-expand seating
Avoid disputes
-fixed cab fares

Reduce
emotional
arousal
-prohibit/
discourage
racial invective
Neutralize peer
pressure
-public health
messaging
Discourage
imitation
-rapid repair of
vandalism
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Encourage ProSocial Behavior
Set rules
-harassment
codes
-rental
agreements
-hotel
registration
Post instructions
-“private
property”
-“no parking”
-“extinguish
camp fires”
Alert conscience
-roadside speed
display boards
-signatures for
customs declar.
Assist
compliance
-make available
garbage cans
-public
restrooms
Control drugs
and alcohol
-breathalyzers
in bars
-permit server
intervention

Again, what is significant is the move to achieve some substantial measure of social
order through institutions and interventions separate from conventional criminal law
enforcement entities, without the potential for harm associated with hands-on policing
tactics and jailing, and in ways that allow for potential offenders to be relatively selfgoverning. This problem-oriented approach is gradual, context-specific, and
incremental—unfinished—and aims to deploy infrastructure and design to achieve
social order maintenance objectives.

D. Decarceration Courts
Certain specialized criminal courts operating as what I have referred to elsewhere
as “Decarceration Courts”—for example, mental health courts and drug courts—may
serve as diversionary conduits funneling substantial numbers of cases out of
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conventional criminal sentencing and toward alternative social service institutions.87
The work of these courts is often empirically monitored to provide evidence that for a
whole range of cases incarceration (and perhaps criminal intervention more generally)
is unnecessary.88 Ultimately, a decarceration model of specialized criminal court case
processing aims to identify those limited number of crimes for which criminal law
intervention is most fitting, simultaneously contributing to the de facto
decriminalization of certain other categories of conduct, and facilitating non-carceral
responses to a range of other social ills.89
It must be noted that there is enormous variation among specialized criminal
courts and some such courts operate on a model decidedly at odds with an agenda of
reduced criminal law enforcement and decarceration. 90 But other specialized
criminal courts are engaged in a social change agenda oriented towards
fundamentally shifting resources and public understanding to enable less violent
means of managing social concerns too often managed through criminal courts and
criminal punishment. 91
This approach to decarceration is necessarily incremental, unfinished: a gradual
and aspirational process of reduced reliance on conventional criminal law
intervention. Ongoing empirical monitoring of the work of diversionary courts may
shape a broader public policy shift away from criminal prosecution and punishment
and toward alternative forms of social order maintenance.92

E. Violence Interrupters
Violence Interrupters interventions, pioneered by the epidemiologist and
infectious disease physician Gary Slutkin, are yet another example of unfinished, in
process criminal law reformist efforts that hold considerable promise in part because
of the alternative conceptualization of social order maintenance they entail. Slutkin’s
Violence Interrupters treat urban violence as an epidemic phenomenon and seek to
shift the spread of violence as a socially contagious learned system by using
community-based mediation outside the criminal process.93 Slutkin proposes that
violence is clustered and spreads in waves like an infectious disease.94 According to
Slutkin, violence may therefore be better addressed not primarily through punitive or
other criminal law-related responses, which were also once applied in the context of
plague and other infectious diseases, but through forms of detection and interruption
that involve community members who themselves previously engaged in violent
See Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law,
100 GEO. L.J. 1587 (2012).
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See id. at 1631.
93 See, e.g., THE INTERRUPTERS (Kartemquin Films 2011).
94 See WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET AL., EVALUATION OF CEASEFIRE—CHICAGO (2008).
87
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behavior. Community members provide to their neighbors and friends alternative
scripts, modes of response, and strategies for deescalating tense situations.95 In their
studies of Violence Interrupters’ work in Chicago and Baltimore, social scientists at
Northwestern and Johns Hopkins Universities demonstrated that homicide rates have
decreased in a statistically significant manner, in one neighborhood by over 50
percent.96
Responding to violence as an infections epidemic represents an as yet
underspecified small-scale framework for some measure of social order maintenance,
one that entails a conceptual and institutional shift in focus towards a public health
model to containing violence. In this regard, Violence Interrupters interventions
present the beginnings of a workable and possibly effective alternative to over-reliance
on policing, prosecution, and incarceration as responses to interpersonal harm. This
approach also enlists persons previously engaged in violence in community selfgovernance and in policy formulation outside the conventional criminal process, in
ways similar to the engagement of former narco-cultivators in the alternative
development programming context through growers cooperatives. The Violence
Interrupters’ epidemiological approach uses these new public health workers to
analyze clusters and transmission dynamics of violence, emphasizing social
psychology and neurological research. 97 This emergent approach may begin to
improve and expand our capacity to speak differently about order maintenance
strategies and community dynamics, creating a new public health discourse about
violence, crime, and alternative modes of conflict resolution and response, one in
which persons formerly perpetrating violence actively and constructively participate.
***
Each of these five initiatives—decriminalization campaigns, alternative
development programming in the narco-cultivation context in a manner potentially
applicable to U.S. narco-markets, infrastructural reform, certain decarcerationfocused diversionary court programming, and violence interrupter interventions—is
legible within an existing state of affairs (that is, each competes) in that each
alternative intervenes in a practical (and at least partially accepted) manner within a
particular geographical location on a small yet significant scale. These are
alternatives that have been implemented, not ideal, theoretical, purely hypothetical
alternatives. Yet, each exercises restraint in refraining from positioning itself as a
fully-formed alternative approach applicable to any and all other contexts. Instead,
with the minor interventions each alternative makes—in terms of restraining and
channeling law enforcement toward potentially more efficacious and less invasive
See, e.g., Gary Slutkin, Re-Understanding Violence As We Had to Re-Understand Plague. To Cure
It, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2012, 11:05am), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/garyslutkin/reunderstanding-violence-_1_b_1431360.html
96 Daniel W. Webster et al., Effects of Baltimore’s Safe Streets Program on gun violence: a
replication of Chicago’s CeaseFire program, J. URB. HEALTH, 27 (2012).
97 See id.
95
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incentive-shaping and opportunity-shaping, and by improving quality of life through
re-directing particular unauthorized and undesired markets, and providing
comprehensive grassroots services to at-risk populations—it becomes possible to begin
to conceive of other more humane ways of achieving social order than through the
status quo in our criminal law, policing, prosecutorial programs, probation, jails and
prisons.

Conclusion
This framework of the alternative as unfinished opens the space to speak about
and imagine different possible organizational arrangements and futures for some of
the social order maintenance work currently carried out by criminal law
administration, potentially instigating a process of material change in our institutions,
as well as in the power relationships that determine who conceptualizes and sets
relevant laws and policies. Even as these efforts are spearheaded by the United
Nations, scholars and local government bodies, these initiatives place otherwise
disenfranchised individuals—peasant farmers in narco-growing regions or former
gang members, for example—in co-equal and even leadership positions. Through
these and other means, unfinished alternatives may make it feasible for fundamentally
distinct approaches to become incrementally conceivable, workable, and enforceable,
and for new voices to gain increased visibility—producing an opening first at the level
of ideas, then within our institutions, and perhaps ultimately within locations of power
and in our criminal law and politics. In these ways, the unfinished reformist
interventions this essay explores may begin to help us engage an array of complex
social problems differently, and to confront and depart from some of criminal law’s
most prevalent violence.

